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Income Tax Considerations in Florida
Personal Injury Actions
RAYMOND T. ELLIGETT, JR.*
The author examines the admissibility of evidence showing
the effect of the exemption from federal income tax on damage
awards for lost earnings. He includes a procedure for incorpo-
rating income tax considerations into the calculation of the
present value of an inflation-adjusted, lost earnings award.
Also analyzed, under both federal and Florida law, is the pro-
priety of a jury instruction that no part of a lost earnings
award is subject to federal income tax.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
the amount of any damages received in compensation for personal
injuries is not taxable income.' As a result of this provision, two
distinct tax issues typically arise whenever a personal injury case is
presented to a jury. First, is evidence showing the effect of the sec-
tion 104 tax exemption on the plaintiff's claim for lost future earn-
* B.A., University of Florida; J.D., Harvard University; Member of the firm of Shackle-
ford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, Florida.
1. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), concerning compensation for injuries or
sickness, provides:
(a) In general
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deduc-
tions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior
taxable year, gross income does not include-
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on
account of personal injuries or sickness.,
Neither compensatory nor punitive damages awarded for personal injuries are taxable. Rev.
Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
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ings admissible? Second, should the jury be instructed that any
damages it awards for the personal injury are tax exempt? In some
cases the courts have confused these two questions, even though
they are analytically distinct.2
II. I.R.C. § 104 AND THE CALCULATION OF LOST FUTURE
EARNINGS
A. The Arguments
Several courts have considered the inherent inequity of a dam-
age claim for lost future earnings that does not include evidence of
the substantial monetary gain realized by virtue of the section 104
tax exemption. For example, in Burlington Northern, Inc. v.
Boxberger,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that the trial court should have admitted evidence re-
garding the plaintiff's income tax liabilities in a claim based upon
future gross earnings. The court based its decision on the rationale
that "the just and elementary rule that the primary aim in measur-
ing damages for a tort should place the injured person as near as
possible in the condition he would have occupied had the wrong
not occurred."4 The court noted that if the plaintiff had not been
injured, it would have been "wholly unrealistic" to assume that he
could have avoided paying income taxes on his gross earnings.
Therefore, allowing evidence of the gross earnings to go to the jury
without any reduction for income taxes can produce an unfairly
exaggerated lost income damage figure. As will be discussed, the
failure to consider taxes may yield too small an award in some
cases.
The Boxberger court discussed and distinguished the appar-
ently contrary rule suggested in McWeeney v. New York, New Ha-
ven & Hartford Railroad.' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in McWeeney held that income taxes should
not be considered in reducing a monetary award for damages in
that particular case, but left the door open for cases in which the
2. See, e.g., Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 296 (9th Cir. 1975); Domer-
acki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883
(1971); see also Comment, Income Taxation and the Calculation of Tort Damage Awards:
The Ramifications of Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289,
290 n.13 (1981).
3. 529 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1975).
4. Id. at 291 (citing C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 560 (1935)).
5. Id.
6. 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
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taxes would make a significant difference to the magnitude of the
award.' By 1975, a number of other circuit courts had endorsed the
McWeeney rule. The Ninth Circuit in Boxberger thus declined to
reject McWeeney outright, but instead applied the Second Cir-
cuit's exception, finding that in the case before it, "the impact of
income taxes ha[d] a significant substantial effect" on the final
damage award.8 The court thus admitted evidence of the tax con-
sequences and the section 104 exemption. The court noted, how-
ever, that "as a matter of fairness and logic, the just approach
would require a rule providing for the admissibility of evidence of,
and corresponding deduction to account for, future income taxes in
all cases." 9
In its opinion, the Boxberger court analyzed the three reasons
suggested by McWeeney for not allowing consideration of the tax
issue. First, the court rejected arguments that including computa-
tion of the plaintiff's future tax liability was too speculative 0 or
too complex for the average jury, noting the sophistication of to-
day's jurors and the highly tax-conscious nature of society in gen-
eral. Second, the Boxberger court also rejected the argument that
not considering income taxes was a substitute for assessment of the
impact of inflation." Finally, the court noted that attorney's fees
had no relation to the jury's task of estimating future income, be-
cause such fees were generally not recoverable as a part of the
plaintiff's case. 2
The United States Supreme Court applied the compelling rea-
7. Id. at 38.
8. The opinion discussed the evolution of the McWeeney rule, noting that some cases
held that the impact of future taxes was "substantial" for income ranges of $15,000 to
$20,000 or $16,000 to $25,000, as contrasted with cases in which the impact was not consid-
ered substantial when the incomes were $4,800, $6,300, or $11,150 annually. 529 F.2d at 294.
The court also indicated that inflation's erosion of these incomes' purchasing power should
not affect the decision to deduct income taxes; that determination turned on the propor-
tional tax "bite," which had remained relatively constant. Id. at 294 n.10.
9. Id. at 294 (emphasis in original). Considering tax consequences for plaintiffs in high
tax brackets, while ignoring them otherwise has been characterized as avoiding large injus-
tices while permitting small or middle-sized injustices. See Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co.,
510 F.2d 234, 242 (5th Cir.) (Gee, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975). One
student commentator argues for applying such a deduction to all lost earnings cases. 46 U.
CIN. L. REV. 297 (1977).
10. 529 F.2d at 292-93. Of course, there would be no speculation as to tax liability for
lost earnings that have accrued by the time of trial because the tax rates would be known.
Several jurisdictions admit tax evidence on past income, but not on future income. See, e.g.,
Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying Virgin Islands
law); Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967).
11. 529 F.2d at 293; see infra text accompanying notes 42-53.
12. 529 F.2d at 293-95.
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soning of Boxberger in Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt."
There the Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision exclud-
ing evidence of the income tax effect on lost earnings, concluding
that "the wage earner's income tax is a relevant factor in calculat-
ing the monetary loss suffered."" The Supreme Court rejected the
argument that evidence as to after-tax earnings was too speculative
or complex for a jury. Likewise, the Court reasoned that under the
"American rule," a prevailing party does not recover attorney's
fees from the opponent.1'
In addition to citing the unpredictability 6 and complexity
7 of
tax calculations, some courts have suggested that section 104(a)(2)
reflects a deliberate congressional intent to award a tax windfall on
lost wages for injured plaintiffs.1' The majority in Liepelt explic-
itly rejected this congressional intent argument and found nothing
in the language of section 104(a)(2) or its legislative history to sug-
gest such an intent.19
B. The Effect of Liepelt
Although both Boxberger and Liepelt were Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act (FELA) cases, there is no logical distinction
that differentiates them from any other personal injury case in-
volving lost income. Both cases involved fatal injuries, but again,
there is no logical distinction between a claim for lost earnings
made by the decedent's survivors in a wrongful death action and
the claim for substantial lost earnings made by one who was seri-
13. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
14. Id. at 494. The Supreme Court suggested that tax evidence need not be permitted
in every case, particularly when the impact of future income tax in calculating the award
would be "de minimis." Id. at 494 n.7. In Liepelt the decedent's gross earnings for the
eleven months before his death in November 1973 amounted to $11,988, and would have
been $16,828 in 1977. Id. at 491-92.
15. But see Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 241 n.1 (5th Cir.) (Gee, J.,
dissenting) (even in the absence of instruction, jurors consider "that lawyers must be paid"),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
16. See, e.g., Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967).
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
18. E.g., Raines v. New York Cent. R.R., 51 IM. 2d 428, 430, 283 N.E.2d 230, 232 (citing
Hall v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151-52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955)), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 983 (1972); see also Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 500-03 (1980) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
19. 444 U.S. at 496 n.10. Thus, the majority did not ignore this rationale, as suggested
in Comment, supra note 2, at 297. See also 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 873, 878 (1981).
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ously injured. 0 Indeed, some prior decisions required considera-
tion of evidence on income tax effects in non-FELA cases and situ-
ations in which the plaintiff survived."'
Subsequent to Liepelt, the Supreme Court stated that the tax
holdings of that case were not limited to FELA cases. The district
courts applied Liepelt in calculating permanently injured plain-
tiffs' lost income damages in non-FELA cases involving maritime
and state law." Later, in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,"2
the Supreme Court articulated a general federal common-law rule
in a case involving a nonfatal injury. Most recently, in Fanetti v.
Hellenic Lines, Ltd.,'" the Second Circuit extended Liepelt to all
claims for future wages based solely on federal law. Relying on "ec-
onomic fairness," the court stated that a jury can be charged to
assume a future tax amount comparable to the past tax amount."'
To establish the amount of taxes the plaintiff would have incurred,
there must be either a stipulation of future taxes in the record or
evidence of past taxes. The court stated that the burden is on the
defendant to present this evidence "in timely and proper
fashion.'2
It appears clear, however, that a federal court will not apply
20. But see Erickson v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 646, 652 (S.D.S.D. 1980). The Er-
ickson court held that Liepelt's deduction for income taxes did not apply to an injury case
in which a wage earner's recovery is based on gross earnings, as contrasted with a wrongful
death case in which a decedent's dependents receive net income. The court apparently con-
fused the concepts of before- and after-tax income with the concept that surviving depen-
dents are entitled only to net accumulations: the decedent wage earner would have con-
sumed some of his income, while an injured wage earner also should receive the amount he
will consume. For a definition of "net accumulations," see FLA. STAT. § 768.18(5) (1981). The
income tax question is distinct from that of net accumulations and is applicable in both
wrongful death and injury cases.
21. E.g., Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (in-
jury from diving into hotel swimming pool); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 184-
86 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying Rhode Island wrongful death statute); Tenore v. Nu Car Carri-
ers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613 (1975).
22. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Texaco, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 561 (W.D. La. 1980); Roselli v.
Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 2, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (injury under the federal Longshore-
man's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); see also Rother v. Interstate & Ocean
Transp. Co., 540 F. Supp. 477, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Weiland v. Pyramid Ventures Group,
511 F. Supp. 1034, 1043 (M.D. La. 1981).
23. 453 U.S. 473, 487 n.17 (1981). In Gulf Offshore, the Court held that Liepelt was to
be applied retroactively. See 453 U.S. at 486 n.16; see also Lang v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 624
F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1980). Contra Fulton v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 675 F.2d 1130 (10th
Cir. 1982); Dunn v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 621 S.W.2d 245, 254 (Mo. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1145 (1982).
24. 678 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1982).
25. Id. at 431.
26. Id. at 432.
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federal common law to cases controlled by state law when the
state's law differs. This was the holding in Croce v. Bromley
Corp.,27 a case arising out of the fatal airplane crash of singer Jim
Croce. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the federal concerns expressed in Liepelt were not
present in a case arising under Louisiana's wrongful death stat-
ute,2 and found no suggestion that Liepelt required giving the in-
struction in wrongful death actions under state law.2 Other circuit
courts reached the same conclusion, 0 while one state supreme
court observed that Liepelt was not based on constitutional
grounds."' This view was apparently confirmed in Gulf Offshore
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., in which the United States Supreme Court
remanded to the Texas state court the issue of whether Louisiana's
law, controlling in the case, required that the jury be instructed
that personal injury damages were not subject to federal income
taxation; if the instruction was not required, the court was to de-
cide whether Liepelt displaced the state rule in cases arising under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
32
Prior to Liepelt, the clear majority rule did not require (or
permit) the admission of evidence regarding the income tax savings
to plaintiffs. 3 One commentator, citing Liepelt, observed that "the
recent trend in tort suits for wrongful death is toward deduction of
27. 623 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
28. The Fifth Circuit also determined that Liepelt's favorable dicta regarding inflation
did not compel it to allow inflation evidence. Id. at 1096-98. But cf. Culver v. Slater Boat
Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (prohibiting evidence on inflation in ascertaining future
damages is unfair); see also infra text accompanying notes 42-52.
29. Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d at 1097.
30. See, e.g., Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1981); Estate of
Spinosa, 621 F.2d 1154, 1158-59 (1st Cir. 1980); see also Kennelly, The Effect of Income
Taxes Upon Earnings in Wrongful Death and Permanent Disability Cases-An Update,
25 TRIAL LAwmR's GUIDE 77, 77-96 (1981) (includes excerpts from the oral argument in
Liepelt).
31. South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 827 (N.D. 1980) (no indi-
cation Liepelt was to apply retroactively and no decision as to whether Liepelt should be
followed in future cases governed by state law). The United States Supreme Court has since
held that Liepelt is to be applied retroactively. See supra note 23; see also Barnette v.
Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1366 (Wyo. 1981) (Liepelt does not control the procedural instruction
issue); Comment, supra note 2, at 299-301.
32. 453 U.S. 473 (1981), vacating in part 594 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). The
case involved the application of 43 U.S.C. § 1332(2) (1976), which mandates that state laws
apply as federal laws in certain proceedings under the Act. On remand, the Texas court
concluded that Louisiana did not require the instruction and that Liepelt did not displace
the state role in an OCSLA case. 628 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
33. See, e.g., Annot., 63 A.L.R. 2D 1393, 1398-404 (1959); cf. Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4TH 589
(1982) (discussing post-Liepelt cases).
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taxes an individual pays on his income prior to the calculation and
present value discounting of the future lost earnings."", In the two
years since Liepelt, however, published opinions referring to that
case have generally been federal diversity cases adhering to the
prevailing state law on tax evidence. 5 One state supreme court has
cited Liepelt while reaffirming its prior ruling requiring the admis-
sion of evidence." Other opinions suggest that Liepelt has had an
impact.3 7 For example, in Grant v. City of Duluth,3 8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court on the basis of Liepelt, holding that the district court was to
instruct the jury that any damages awarded would not be subject
to income taxes. Although contrary to the Minnesota Supreme
Court's prior decisions on this issue, the Eighth Circuit held that
its decision was justified because the Minnesota precedents ante-
dated Liepelt.3' Interestingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court dis-
cussed Liepelt just two weeks later in Marynik v. Burlington
Northern, Inc. ,40 an FELA case, but did not indicate what effect, if
any, Liepelt would have on state law. The Marynik court stated
that the failure to give an instruction on the nontaxability of the
damage award was error, although on the facts of the case, the er-
34. Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A. J. 1527, 1528 (1980)
(citation omitted). More common are articles criticizing Liepelt's evidence holding, see, e.g.,
Comment, supra note 2, or both the evidence and instruction rulings. See, e.g., Kennelly,
supra note 30. But see 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 873 (1981).
35. See, e.g., Fenasci v. Travelers Ins. Co., 642 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1982); Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Gerbich v. Evans, 525 F. Supp. 817, 819 (D. Col. 1981); cases
cited supra note 26; see also Reuter v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(following Pennsylvania law in not allowing reduction for income tax); In re Air Crash Dis-
aster Near Chicago, Ill., 526 F. Supp. 226, 231 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (submission of evidence and
instruction on taxation would necessitate forecasting Illinois law, a process the court de-
scribed as "only slightly more reliable than predictions of the future arrived at by reading
the entrails of sheep"); cf. Louissant v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 111 Misc. 2d 122, 443
N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1981). In Louissant the state trial court followed prior New York law
in not allowing a tax deduction. It also sought to distinguish a recent New York case, Gil-
liard v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 77 A.D.2d 532, 430 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1980),
which had not cited Liepelt, but in reducing a wrongful death award, had noted that the
decedent would have paid income and social security taxes.
36. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569, 417 A.2d 15, 18 (1980).
37. See, e.g., Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 183 (8th Cir. 1982); Pesses v. Supe-
rior Court, 107 Cal. App. 3d 117, 122, 165 Cal. Rptr. 680, 683 (1980); Delmarva Power &
Light Co. v. Burrows, 435 A.2d 716, 721 (Del. 1981); In re Eader, 24 Ohio Op. 3d 83, 85, 434
N.E.2d 757, 759 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
38. 672 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1982).
39. Id. at 683.
40. 317 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. 1982).
19821
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ror was harmless. 1
C. Taxes and Inflation
An analysis of cases decided before Liepelt and Boxberger in-
dicates that some courts viewed the inadmissibility of tax evidence
as a fair trade-off for the inadmissibility of evidence on inflation.4"
In Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc.,"' the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled unanimously that the trial court must permit a plain-
tiff to introduce evidence about inflation. Likewise, the court must
allow a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff's
witnesses to elicit testimony concerning income tax liability or to
develop the matter by extrinsic evidence.
Traditionally, trial courts have not allowed juries to consider
inflation in setting damage awards." But many courts have re-
cently departed from that tradition, as exemplified by Tenore.
Florida's District Court of Appeal for the Second District 45 was
among the vanguard admitting evidence on inflation, observing
that jurors probably would consider it even in the absence of any
evidence. In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Garrison," the Sec-
ond District rejected the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit's view, enunciated in Johnson v. Penrod Drilling
Co.,4 that evidence on inflation was too speculative to be admit-
ted." Perhaps persuaded by the trend among other federal courts
to assess the effect of inflation, the Fifth Circuit recently overruled
Johnson. After rehearing en banc Culver v. Slater Boat Co.49 and
Byrd v. Heinrich Schmidt Reederei,50 the Fifth Circuit held that
41. Id. at 351.
42. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960); see
also Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1975).
43. 67 N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613 (1975).
44. See Note, Future Inflation, Prospective Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63 VA.
L. REv. 105, 125 (1977); 62 CORNELL L. REV. 803 (1977).
45. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Garrison, 336 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); see also
Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (Fla. 1977) (citing Garrison with approval); cf.
Griesemer v. Prathers, Inc., 413 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (reaffirming Garrison and
using consideration of inflation as basis for affirming jury verdict in excess of economist's
calculation of lost earnings). See generally Oberhofer, Wrongful Death Act Settlements, 56
FLA. B.J. 613 (1982) (discussing the effects of changing inflation and interest rates on wrong-
ful death settlements).
46. 336 So. 2d 423, 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
47. 510 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1975). The Johnson court also asserted that the predic-
tion of tax consequences was "too speculative." Id. at 236-37.
48. 336 So. 2d at 423-24.
49. 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'g 644 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1981).
50. 688 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'g 638 F.2d 1300, 1308 (5th Cir. 1981).
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prohibiting evidence on inflation in ascertaining future damages
was unfair. 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
which decided Mc Weeney, recently ruled in Doca v. Marina Mer-
cante Nicaraguense, S.A. that trial courts should now consider in-
flation in estimating the present value of lost future wages.5 2 Thus,
that court now has eroded one of the bases for not considering
taxes. The Second Circuit termed Liepelt "instructive" when men-
tioning the court's previous rejection of a deduction for taxes in
Mc Weeney.
D. Calculating Inflation and Taxes
Some courts have presumed that the rate of inflation equals
the discount rate or the anticipated interest on investment, so that
the finder of fact can disregard both. This "total offset method"
may contribute to "judicial efficiency," but is often criticized as
imprecise. 4
Other methods of calculation allow expert testimony regarding
inflation and discount rates. A court may allow future damages for
each year to be increased at the rate of inflation and then have
each year's inflated damages reduced to present value at the dis-
count rate. This two-step method has been called the "indepen-
dent incorporation method."55
The "offset method" is another procedure for considering both
inflation and investment earnings. 5e Under this method, the court
subtracts the inflation rate from the discount rate to arrive at an
"inflation-adjusted discount rate." This rate is then used to dis-
count the future damages to present value. 7 The court in Feldman
v. Allegheny Airlines8 used this calculation after a percentage of
the award representing the income tax exemption had been
subtracted.59
51. Culver, 688 F.2d at 305.
52. Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 36-39 (2d Cir. 1980).
53. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 1982);
Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665, 671 (Alaska 1967); 62 CORNEL L. REv. 803, 808 (1977).
54. See, e.g., Note, supra note 44, at 127-28.
55. Id. at 111.
56. Id.
57. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1293-94 (D. Conn.), afl'd, 524
F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1974); Note, supra note 44, at 123; 62 CORNELL L. REv. at 810.
58. 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975) (forecasting Connecticut law).
59. The inflation-adjusted (offset) calculation generally will produce a slightly smaller
lump sum than the two-step independent incorporation. method. See Note, supra note 44, at
19821
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Some courts have addressed the actual mathematics of calcu-
lating the tax deduction, although a comprehensive method has
not been formulated." To compensate a plaintiff adequately, the
calculation would need to indicate that interest earned on the in-
vested principal would be taxable,"' and would need to "add back"
those taxes.62 An acceptable procedure incorporating tax consider-
ations into the inflation/present value calculation of the sum to be
awarded for lost income would be as follows: 8 First, determine
111. One commentator favors the offset method because of its simplicity and its utilization
of the historical differential between interest and inflation rates. 62 CORNELL L. REV. at 814,
816. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal favorably cited the Feldman inflation-
adjusted approach in Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Garrison, 336 So. 2d 423, 425 n.4 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1976), because it is more readily understood by juries. Furthermore, the difference in
results may not be significant in light of other variables such as the uncertainty of future
inflation and earnings rates, and whether the discount rate is based on "risk-free"
investments.
60. See, e.g., De Lucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1982) (also computing
taxes paid on interest from award); see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text; see also
Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Felder v. United
States, 543 F.2d 657, 672-74 (9th Cir. 1976) (also considering effects of income tax shelters
in calculations); Roselli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 2, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Abille v.
United States, 482 F. Supp. 703, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (applying Alaska law and calculating
taxes only as to past earnings); Armentrout v. Virginia Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997 (S.D. W. Va.
1947), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948); Henderson, Some Recent Deci-
sions on Damages, with Special Reference to Questions of Inflation and Income Taxes, 40
INS. COUNSEL J. 423, 437 (1973).
61. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Riverway Terminal Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1201 (7th Cir.
1982); Hollinger v. United States, 651 F.2d 636, 642 (9th Cir. 1981); McWeeney v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1960); see also Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt,
444 U.S. 490, 495 (1980). Kennelly argues that giving an instruction that awards are not
taxable is prejudicial to plaintiffs because it ignores the fact that interest earned on the
awards is taxable. Kennelly, supra note 30, at 100. This is a non sequitur, however, since the
quid pro quo for considering taxes on interest earned would be first to consider taxes that
would be paid on the earnings portion of the award. These are both evidentiary matters,
while the cautionary instruction discussed below can and should be given, even in the ab-
sence of any evidence as to taxes.
62. Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax
Law, 46 A.B.A. J. 274 (1960). See Ward & Olson, The Economic Impact of Income Tax on
Damage Awards, TRIAL, Aug. 1981, at 47, 48-49, which also observes that in the case of a
plaintiff-survivor, the taxes on the interest may be paid at a higher rate because the tax-
payer might then be single, rather than married and filing a joint return. This might be
alleviated to some extent by the Internal Revenue Code's provisions for surviving spouses.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed such an add-back of taxes on interest earned in De Lucca v.
United States, 670 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1982).
63. As in considering inflation and present value, one would expect that many of these
calculations would be presented in expert testimony. See, e.g., Hooks v. Washington Shera-
ton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284,
293 (9th Cir. 1975); Roselli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 2, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Corboy, Economic Experts in Tort Litigation, LITIGATION, Winter 1982, at 28; Morris &
Nordstrom, supra note 62, at 328.
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gross income for future years (including increases for inflation);
second, compute taxes on that income; third, subtract taxes from
gross income to yield net income;64 and fourth, reduce net income
to present value. 6
If the computation ceased at this point, the present values
could simply be added to obtain the principal awarded for lost fu-
ture income. But, this would not consider possible taxes to be paid
on the interest derived from the principal. To include this, the cal-
culation would continue: fifth, the interest earned on the principal
sum in a given year would be calculated by multiplying the interest
rate times the principal remaining in the given year. 6 Finally, the
taxes on this interest would then be discounted to present value
and added back to the principal to be awarded.
The final step does not reflect that the amount added back for
taxes on the interest will earn interest that will also be taxed. This
will produce a shortfall, requiring a further addition to the tax
addback. Also, the addback for total taxes on interest is based on
the assumption that the plaintiff would not have invested any of
his annual earnings (and thus not have paid taxes on interest
earned) in the absence of being injured. Theoretically, the tax add-
back should not include the taxes on such interest. As when only
present value and inflation are considered, the assumptions of the
trier of fact (or the expert) affect all of the figures.
A simplified example illustrates the effects of this procedure:
1) Assume lost gross income of $60,000 per year for
ten years.
2) The plaintiff is married, filing jointly, with his
spouse, and has two minor dependents. Based on 1981 tax
rates (assuming no income from his spouse and no
itemization of deductions), taxes would be $17,718 per
year.
64. In a wrongful death case, a deduction would also be made for the decedent's per-
sonal consumption. See Corboy, supra note 63, at 31; Henderson, supra note 60, at 437; see
also FLA. STAT. § 768.18(5) (1981).
65. This procedure essentially adopts the independent incorporation approach to infla-
tion, since the gross income in step 1 adds inflation and the present value calculation in step
4 reduces it. The inflation-adjusted (offset) approach could be used by not increasing the
gross income in step 1 for inflation, and then by using an inflation-adjusted present value
rate in step 4.
66. The interest rate used in this computation would be the rate that was assumed for
the purpose of making the present value reduction in step 4. The amount awarded to the
plaintiff for that year would be composed of that interest and as much of the principal
necessary to reach the total awarded for the year. See infra note 67.
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3) Net income per year would equal $42,282 ($60,000 -
$17,718).
4) Assuming an annual interest rate of 8%, then to
obtain a payment of $42,282 per year for ten years, the
sum of the present values would equal $283,717.
5) The 8% interest on the principal sum would range
from $22,697 in the first year to $3,132 in the final year.
Thus, $42,282 in year 1 would be the sum of the $22,697 in
interest plus $19,585 of the principal. This would leave
$264,132 principal in the second year to earn interest at
8%. The calculations are summarized in the table on the
following page.
6) The taxes on the interest (using the assumptions in
step 2 above) would range from $2,912 in the first year to
zero in the last two years. Discounted to present value,
these taxes would total $9,837.
Therefore, in this example, failing to add back the taxes paid
on interest earned would result in the plaintiff being underpaid by
approximately $9,837. But failing to consider taxes at all would re-
sult in the defendant overpaying by more than $109,000.67 In dif-
ferent situations, however, the consideration of the income tax ef-
fects, including tax addbacks, may actually produce a larger
award.6"
67. $60,000 per year gross income reduced to present value, assuming 8% interest,
would result in a principal payment of $402,605, as contrasted with the fully tax-adjusted
award of $283,717 + $9,837 (tax add-back) = $293,554. Thus, the true savings to a defen-
dant in this situation from considering taxes is $109,051 (the gross award of $600,000 would
have included $177,180 of tax liability, but this would be reduced to present value along
with the rest of the award). See Corboy, supra note 63, at 31, which includes an example
using lower annual earnings and a longer work life expectancy, resulting in an overall in-
crease of the award when taxes on the lost income and on the interest from the award are
considered, and Henderson, supra note 60, at 440-41, which includes a tabular calculation
that also deducts personal expenses in a wrongful death case, but does not add back taxes
on interest, although these considerations are recognized as a factor. See also Ward & Olson,
supra note 62, at 49.
68. Actually, as noted supra p. 653, the failure of this example to consider the taxes
accruing on interest earned on the tax addback results in a shortfall of approximately an-
other $640.00. The failure to make these further refinements in other applications (such as a
longer life span or an increasing wage rate) may be more significant. For their assistance in
developing this procedure, the author is indebted to Dr. Jane K. Elligett of the University of
South Florida, and Dr. Gary Anderson of the University of Miami, who is presently prepar-
ing an article that will present a more detailed economic analysis of these considerations.
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III. JURY INSTRUCTION ON INCOME TAX
The multi-step tax deduction calculation contrasts with the
simplicity of a jury instruction that no portion of the award to the
plaintiff is subject to federal income taxation. 9 As noted above, in
claims for wrongful death or personal injuries, any damages
awarded (whether for lost future income or other elements of dam-
ages) are not subject to federal income tax by virture of section 104
of the Internal Revenue Code. Numerous courts and commentators
have noted the tendency among juries to increase awards because
of the erroneous assumption that any amount awarded will be sub-
ject to taxation.70 Judge Gee of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has described the tax-exempt status of such
awards as a "relatively occult piece of information which jurors are
unlikely to know."'" The court in Burlington Northern, Inc. v.
Boxberger stated,
We cannot believe that, in the absence of such an instruction,
many jurors would not assume that the award would be taxable
and thus be inclined to increase their damage award accordingly.
The benefits of informing the jury of the true tax consequences
are so clear, and the burden in terms of time and the possibility
of confusion so minimal, that we believe the balance is over-
whelmingly in favor of giving such an instruction. To put the
matter simply, giving the instruction can do no harm, and it can
certainly help by preventing the jury from inflating the award
and thus overcompensating the plaintiff on the basis of an erro-
neous assumption that the judgment will be taxable.7
The United States Supreme Court in Liepelt quoted the last sen-
tence from the Boxberger excerpt above and added,
We hold that it was error to refuse the requested instruc-
tion in this case. That instruction was brief and could be easily
69. Indeed, several courts have required the giving of the tax instruction while not re-
quiring or permitting evidence of the tax windfall in lost income awards. See, e.g., Domer-
acki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883
(1971); Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo. 1952). The wording of the requested
instruction in Liepelt was: "[Y]our award will not be subject to any income taxes, and you
should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount of your award." 444 U.S. 490, 492
(1980). For a slightly different variation previously used in Florida, see Poirier v. Shireman,
129 So. 2d 439, 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
70. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 496-97 (1980); Burlington N.,
Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 296-97 (9th Cir. 1975) (observing that the instruction is
favored by an "overwhelming majority" of commentators); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Tenore v. Nu Car
Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 495, 341 A.2d 613, 629 (1975).
71. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co. 510 F.2d 234, 241 (5th Cir.) (Gee, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
72. Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir. 1975).
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understood. It would not complicate the trial by making addi-
tional qualifying or supplemental instructions necessary. It
would not be prejudicial to either party, but would merely elimi-
nate an area of doubt or speculation that might have an im-
proper impact on the computation of the amount of damages."'
Subsequently, in Gulf Offshore, the Supreme Court observed
that "failure to give the instruction may lead to the plaintiff recov-
ering a windfall award. '74 Additionally, the refusal to allow both
evidence regarding taxes and a jury instruction presents the danger
of doubling the tax error. Describing this danger, the court in
Boxberger said,
The trial court's denial of both . . . requests (to present evi-
dence of the impact of future income taxation on future earn-
ings, and to instruct the jury that the earnings award would not
be taxable) had the possible effect of overcompensating the
claimants by twice awarding taxes-once by using gross income
to measure lost earnings and a second time, if the award was
increased upon the fallacious assumption that an additional in-
crement was needed to compensate for income taxes to be paid
from the award.75
State courts' reaction to both Liepelt's evidentiary and in-
struction rulings has been surprisingly mixed, especially with re-
gard to the latter."0 In two types of situations, some courts have
73. 444 U.S. at 498; see also Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th
Cir. 1975); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 883 (1971); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 495, 341 A.2d 613, 629
(1975).
74. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 n.16 (1981).
75. 529 F.2d at 297; see also Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 242 n.4 (5th
Cir.) (Gee, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
76. Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md. 319, 438 A.2d 1330, 1334 (1982) (refusal to give in-
struction was error); Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 937, 403 N.E.2d
402, 407-08 (1980) (instruction not required when tax issue not injected through evidence or
counsels' comments); Tennis v. General Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218, 226-28 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981) (refusal to give instructions supported by committee's comment that recently
amended standard jury instruction on income tax was to be used only in FELA cases); Scal-
Ion v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843, 845 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (jury instruction on tax effects
analogous to collateral source rule); South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d
819, 827 (N.D. 1980) (following its earlier opinion not permitting instruction, but making no
decision as to future state law cases); Dehn v. Prouty, 321 N.W.2d 534, 539 (S.D. 1982) (3-2
decision upholding trial court's refusal to give instruction); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d
1349, 1367 (Wyo. 1981) (instruction not required).
In Grant v. City of Duluth, 672 F.2d 677, 683 (8th Cir. 1982), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that in diversity cases, the jury instruction must be
given in the absence of a contrary state decision issued subsequent to Liepelt. The last
forum state case to consider the question, a 1978 pre-Liepelt Minnesota decision, had held
that it was not error to refuse the instruction. Two weeks after the Eighth Circuit's decision,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the failure to give an instruction in a FELA case
1982]
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not required that the trial judge give a tax instruction: (1) when
evidence or counsels' comments had not injected into the case the
question of taxation;"7 or (2) when the jury was not instructed re-
garding attorney's fees.7 8 The rationales cannot withstand scrutiny
in either of these situations. First, as noted above, the question of
an award's taxability is likely to be ever-present in the juror's
mind, even when evidence about taxes has not been presented dur-
ing the trial. Thus, if the instruction is given, it will correct mis-
conceptions that already exist. Second, to say that jurors are not
instructed that a plaintiff must pay his attorney is simply no re-
sponse in light of the American rule that generally does not permit
payment of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Quite simply, it
is illogical to argue that not giving an attorney's fee instruction is a
trade-off for the tax instruction when the parties are not entitled
to attorney's fees, but are entitled to an award not distorted be-
cause of a jury's erroneous view of the tax laws.
Twenty years ago, University of Florida law student, Jack R.
Schoonover, who is currently a judge on Florida's Second District
Court of Appeal, advocated that courts should give a nontaxability
instruction regardless of the nature of the award.7 9 Florida courts
had not ruled on whether to follow the majority or minority rule
with respect to lost income awards. Judge Schoonover observed
that the typical instruction (that any award is not subject to in-
come taxation and thus taxes should not be considered in fixing
the amount of the award) would have to be modified or supple-
mented in cases where jurors were to consider evidence of income
tax savings on the lost income portion of the award. 0
IV. FLORIDA LAW
In Poirier v. Shireman,8' Florida's Second District Court of
Appeal upheld the propriety of a jury instruction stating that any
award given to the plaintiff would not be taxable. In Poirier the
trial court gave the instruction, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing
that the damages awarded were inadequate. 82 The appellate court
was a harmless error. Marynik v. Burlington N., Inc., 317 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Minn. 1982).
77. See, e.g., Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 937, 403 N.E.2d 402,
407 (1980).
78. See, e.g., South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 827 (N.D. 1980);
Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1367 (Wyo. 1981).
79. Note, Instructing the Jury Not to Consider Income Taxation in Personal Injury
Award, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 128, 131 (1962).
80. Id. at 133.
81. 129 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). For a brief discussion of Poirier and its implica-
tions, see 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 126 (1961).
82. 129 So. 2d at 440.
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held that the giving of the instruction was not error. This decision
was later followed by the Third District Court of Appeal. 3
Two district courts of appeal have addressed the question
whether a court must give an instruction on income taxes when
counsel requests it. Both courts held that under the facts of the
cases, it was a matter of discretion for the trial court as to whether
it is proper to give the requested instruction." The court in Atlan-
tic Coastline Railroad v. Braza5 observed that it might have been
proper to give the requested instruction, but did not find "on the
facts involved" that it was required, when $185,000 was awarded. 6
Similarly, in St. Johns River Terminal Co. v. Vaden,87 the court
held that the instruction need not be given unless the matter of
income tax liability had been injected into the case."8 Of course, if
the plaintiff's expert witness presents gross income figures, this
necessarily injects the evidentiary issue of income tax liability (or
lack of it) into a case. More importantly, as noted above, the mod-
ern jury is likely to assume a tax liability exists in the absence of
an instruction.
In Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bell,"9 the trial court
awarded a new trial for several reasons, including the possibility
that the jury weighed the tax consequences of its damage award.
The First District Court of Appeal reversed the new trial order,
noting that the court clearly instructed the jury that tax matters
were not to be considered. 0 The Florida Supreme Court subse-
quently reversed the First District's opinion and reinstated the
new trial order.9'
Florida's wrongful death statute and the recently adopted cor-
83. Stager v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 163 So. 2d 15, 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964).
84. St. Johns River Terminal Co. v. Vaden, 190 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), cert.
denied, 200 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1967); Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Braz, 182 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1966), quashed on other grounds, 196 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1967).
85. 182 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), quashed on other grounds, 196 So. 2d 109 (Fla.
1967).
86. Id. at 495.
87. 190 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1967).
88. Id. at 42. In dicta the Vaden court suggested that lost earnings should be based on
gross income, citing the congressional intent, conjecture, and complication rationales. Id.
Comment, supra note 2, at 290 n.13, mentions Vaden as an example of a decision that
confused the evidence and instructions issues. Vaden was an FELA case, which in light of
Liepelt would no longer be followed in other cases in which federal law controls, since the
United States Supreme Court has now ruled that a court must give a tax instruction. Gulf
Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 487 n.17 (1981). In Flanigan v. Burlington N.,
Inc.,*632 F.2d 880, 886-87 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981), the court
mentioned Vaden as one of a long list of cases overruled by Liepelt.
89. 384 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1980).
90. 363 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), rev'd, 384 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1980).
91. 384 So. 2d at 146.
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responding jury instruction define a decedent's net accumulations
specifically in terms of income "after taxes."92 Applying Florida
law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit cited
this statute in holding that a trial court did not err in reducing the
damages awarded by the amount of the decedent's future income
tax liability.93 Indeed, in light of the statute, it appears that when
a plaintiff in a wrongful death case has used gross income figures,
the trial court would have to allow evidence on the income tax
savings. 4
Therefore, aside from wrongful death cases, Florida has no de-
finitive position on tax evidence at this time, and it is within the
trial court's discretion whether to give the instruction. To date,
Florida's courts have not indicated how they will proceed on the
tax evidence and instruction issues in light of the Supreme Court's
recent reexamination of the question in Liepelt.
V. CONCLUSION
Florida's concern with the accuracy of damage awards for per-
sonal injuries is reflected in its wrongful death statute, which al-
lows for the consideration of inflation and dictates that net income
should be used to calculate lost future income. The emphasis
should be on accurate awards, given that a consideration of income
taxes may increase, as well as decrease, the award. The complexity
of the calculation may vary according to the amounts involved and
whether there would be significant taxes paid on the interest to be
earned from the principal sum. Thus, income tax evidence may not
be appropriate in cases where it would not significantly affect the
award. Nevertheless, there is no persuasive reason for refusing to
give a simple jury instruction in personal injury actions to the ef-
fect that any amount awarded is not subject to taxation. An in-
struction on taxation should take its place among Florida's stan-
dard jury instructions.
92. FLA. STAT. § 768.18(5) (1981); FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civ.) 6.4(c)
(1980).
93. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 1005 (6th Cir. 1975).
94. A student article cited FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.18(5) (West Supp. 1976) for the prop-
osition that it required the deduction of income taxes from wrongful death awards. 62 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 803, 815 (1977). In a recent wrongful death case, the net accumulation was
computed after taxes. Griesemer v. Prathers, Inc., 413 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The
court in Leaseco, Inc. v. Bartlett, 257 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), cert. denied, 262 So.
2d 447 (Fla. 1972), cited dicta in Vaden without discussion for the principle that in the
wrongful death action before it, earnings could be based on gross earnings rather than net
earnings after taxes. But Leaseco and Vaden arose before the effective date of FLA. STAT.
§ 768.18(5) (1981), under the more general language of its predecessor. The court's refusal in
Frazier v. Ewell Eng'g & Contracting Co., 62 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 1952), to sanction a reduc-
tion of a widow's damage award is inapposite because the decedent's pension was tax-
exempt.
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